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The paper assesses the energy sector’s foreign exchange requirements for meeting energy 
consumption and for capital expenditures, and identifies its implications for the country’s 
macroeconomic policy and management. We develop a conceptual model for projecting the 
energy sector’s long-term requirements for foreign exchange. The model indicates that the 
country’s chronic dependence on oil imports is likely to expose the economy  to high and 
volatile oil prices. A fundamental issue for Pakistan is how the energy projects requiring large 
inflows of foreign capital and technology will be financed. The main implication of our 
analysis is that there will be continuing pressure on the country’s foreign exchange resources. 
The demand for foreign exchange by the year 2024-25 is projected to be US$ 20-21 billion 
without the FDI in new power generation. However, when we include the requirements of 
foreign exchange for capital expenditure, the total FX requirements are in the range of US$ 23-
24 billion. An implication of the country’s chronic energy deficiency is that the 
macroeconomic policies, particularly the foreign exchange rate policy, need to be redefined to 
reflect the projected demands on hard currencies and their expected scarcity value. It is likely 
that Pakistan will remain dependent on foreign imports to meet its energy requirements for a 
long time and will need to generate commensurate foreign exchange resources to ensure long-
term energy security. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan’s energy crisis, despite being a focus of political, technical and economic 
analyses and discussions, seems to be continuing unabated. Not with standing the fact 
that there have been numerous studies that have identified critical issues and the available 
options in the energy sector, the energy deficit seems to be ever-increasing. An issue that 
has been overlooked in this debate relates to how the energy sector’s foreign exchange 
requirements for meeting current consumption and for capital expenditures for creating 
domestic capacity would be financed. This paper seeks to address this question, and 
follows up with identifying its implications for the country’s macroeconomic policy and 
management. 
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In order to address the energy crisis, the government is planning and implementing 
various structural measures, such as increasing share of renewable energy production, 
diversification and rebalancing of the energy production mix, reducing oil intensity, and 
exploring fossil fuels [Pakistan (2013); NEPRA (2013)]. However, the energy 
infrastructure and production projects are heavily capital and technology intensive. They 
necessitate foreign investment with concomitant foreign exchange liabilities for 
repatriation of returns and the principle. Moreover, the gestation periods for such 
measures to make a substantial impact is generally quite long. In addition to the 
increasing energy demand in the country, volatile oil prices pose another challenge that 
call for physical and financial strategies for hedging price risk. Such strategies, however, 
also require substantial foreign exchange resources [Bacon and Kojima (2008); Daniel 
(2001)]. 
It is likely that Pakistan will remain dependent on foreign imports to meet its 
energy requirements for a long time [Ahmed (2007)], and will need to generate 
commensurate foreign exchange resources to ensure long-term energy security. The 
paper addresses the implications for macro-economic policies given the country’s chronic 
dependence on imported energy and continuing pressure on its foreign exchange 
resources. More specifically, the study first rigorously establishes the above chronic 
energy deficit hypothesis. Second, it elaborates the logical consequences of this condition 
for the demand for foreign exchange. Third, the paper discusses implications for macro-
economic strategies, in particular, with respect to the foreign exchange regime and related 
interest rates, foreign trade, and domestic and foreign direct investment policies. We 
make international comparisons of macro-economic policies adopted by countries which 
face secular energy deficits comparable to Pakistan. After discussing various policy 
alternatives, the paper concludes with some recommendations. 
With regards to the continuing energy crisis in Pakistan, there have been a 
number of academic studies and policy papers on the subject [e.g., Alahdad (2012); 
Ghayur (2007); Malik (2008, 2010); Siddiqui (2004); Kugelman (2013)]. The major 
focus of these studies has, however, been on basic long-term structural measures 
designed to reduce oil consumption over the long run, achieve energy portfolio 
diversification away from oil-fired power generation, improve energy efficiency, and 
demand management. These strategies provide the potential to reduce exposure to high 
and volatile oil prices, but do not address the long-term fundamental problem of energy 
poverty. In general, there is a dearth of studies on the implications of energy deficit for 
macro-economic policies for the energy-importing developing countries. Other studies 
deal with the impact of energy shortages on the macro-economies, energy production 
strategies, and demand management. For example, see Finleya (2012), Bielecki (2002), 
Pandey (2006), Labandeira and Manzano (2012) and Munasinghe (1984). On the 
contrary there have been a number of studies with respect to oil exporting and devel-
oped countries [IMF (2003); IMF (2012); Sturm, et al. (2009)] that examine the macro-
economic policy options for oil surplus countries. Moreover, the policy options and 
alternative strategies have to be country specific and must take into account the 
country’s economic and industry structures. Therefore, this paper is likely to contribute 
significantly to the development of a long-term economic strategy to enhance energy 
security for Pakistan. 
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2.  BACKGROUND ON THE OIL SECTOR 
Pakistan is an oil producer, but the domestic production of crude oil meets only 
16-20 percent of the total consumption. Importing crude oil, high-speed diesel, fuel oil 
and other petroleum products fills the remaining 80-84 percent of demand. The oil prices 
in the international markets steadily increased since 2001; over 2001-2013 the crude 
prices increased five times. Though the consumption of petroleum products only 
increased marginally, the rise in the petroleum prices brought the country’s current 
account under strain. The share of import bill for petroleum products in current account 
balance increased from 23 percent to 35 percent in last twenty years. The increase in the 
world oil prices, particularly in 2004-2008, led the government to roll back its 
deregulation policy and exert a greater control on the sector, with a view to protecting the 
consumer from the brunt of full pass-through of the international prices. The government 
uses direct and indirect price controls (moral suasion) to keep oil products and LPG 
prices low for the benefit of the consumers. It results in domestic prices being below the 
prevailing international prices.1 This implicit price ceiling reduces the quantity of LPG 
imports; consequently a shortage results, and a “black market” emerges with end-users 
paying higher prices. The Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) sets the price 
ceilings through official notification. The price is based on the Arab Gulf fuel ex-
refinery/import-parity price, and other charges include customs and excise duty, sales tax, 
other levies and a distribution margin. 
Following the sharp rise in the world oil prices during the 2004-2008 period, the 
government took several steps to protect consumers by imposing a cap on the domestic 
sale prices [MPNR (2005)]. The policy of providing relief to the consumers was also 
implemented by reducing the petroleum development levy (PDL) which overtime was 
reduced to zero. In 2004, the government also started to pay a ‘price differential claim’ 
(PDC) to compensate the oil companies for the lower price charged to the consumers, 
particularly for kerosene and diesel oil. The oil policy therefore not only led to the 
government subsidising oil consumption, but also resulted in reducing the tax revenues 
accruing to the government. Over time, the policy has had a substantial negative impact 
on the fiscal position of the government. Despite the government’s efforts to provide 
subsidies to cushion the increases in international oil prices, the increase in the end-user 
domestic prices has led to fierce protests. There have been numerous strikes and price 
increases at the pump have been challenged in the courts. On the other hand, the energy 
policy quite predictably has resulted in continuing energy shortages manifested as 
blackouts of unprecedented duration and frequency. It is said that one of the major causes 
of the ruling PPP government’s defeat at the polling booth in May 2013 has been its 
failure to satisfactorily address the energy crisis. Besides the government, the oil 
companies have also been blamed for exploiting the situation and profiteering at the 
expense of the public. 
Another factor exacerbating the energy crisis has been the rising demand for 
energy fuelled by robust economic growth over 2002-2007; the average real rate of 
 
1
For example, the ceiling was about US$300 per ton, against international LPG prices exceeding 
US$500 per tonne at times. In April 2006, wellhead LPG prices were increased from Rs 17,000 (US$283) per 
tonne to Rs 20,200 (US$337). 
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growth was 6.22 percent over this period. Besides the energy sector the transport sector is 
another main user of the petroleum products. The demand for petroleum products from 
this sector was attenuated somewhat by a large scale substitution of gasoline and heavy 
fuel oil with natural gas. The conversions were the result of government’s pricing 
structure, which created financial incentives in its favour. A record number of gasoline 
powered vehicles were switched to CNG to the point that Pakistan had the third largest 
number of CNG vehicles in the world, with 63.3 percent of the vehicles running on 
CNG.2 
Pakistan has been so far self-sufficient in natural gas, but the gas reserves are 
depleting at a fast rate and gas shortages have started to appear. Pakistan’s reserves-to-
production (R/P) ratio stood at slightly less than 35 years in 2004. At the end of 2012 it is 
estimated to be only 15.5 years.3 As such, the country’s import of natural gas (LPG) will 
become substantial in the near future. This will be true particularly as the Iran-Pakistan 
gas pipeline becomes operational, though it stands a very small chance because of the 
non-availability of finance as per the recent announcement of the Iranian government. 
The price gap between the government’s implicit ceiling on LPG prices and 
corresponding import-parity prices has contributed to supply shortages. Although in the 
recent years the government has raised the price of gasoline in order to partially offset the 
lower prices of kerosene and diesel, the net subsidy has been large and has contributed to 
fiscal deficits. 
Management of the demand side has also been lacking. The policies to discourage 
use of large automobiles, air-conditioners and other power-guzzling appliances have been 
either absent or non-effective. Nominal energy conservation campaigns have mostly 
relied on public exhortations without much effect on consumer behaviour. Steps to 
combat energy pilferage and payment delinquencies have also not yielded the desired 
results, partly because of the ability of the opposition groups and vested interests to block 
such moves by the government. 
The impact of energy crisis on the macro-economy is also well documented in the 
academic literature, financial press and government policy documents. The Planning 
Commission estimates that as a result of losses from power and gas shortages, the 
average GDP growth rate of Pakistan’s economy has  decreased by 3-4 percent since 
2010 onward [NEPRA (2012)]. Technical experts on the energy industry, like Zahid 
Hussain (ex-CEO of OGDC), Shahid Sattar of Planning Commission and others, are on 
record drawing a grave outlook for the energy sector. At a seminar held at PIDE in May 
2013, Sattar said that the Planning Commission estimates show that the power sector 
deficit will balloon to Rs 742 billion ($7.4 billion) in the current financial year. The 
circular debt has touched around the Rs 600 billion-mark, while the overall losses may 
touch Rs 2,000 billion up to June 30, 2013. Pakistan is currently spending two percent of 
GDP on the power sector, which needs to be jacked up to 4-4.5 percent on an immediate 
basis to cater to the demand. In order to end the power crisis, Pakistan will have to focus 
on nuclear civil energy and the production of electricity through coal. A visiting senior 
fellow at PIDE, Alahdad, attributed the prevailing condition to lost opportunities, 
 
2
 IANGV (International Association for Natural Gas Vehicles). Current Natural Gas Vehicle Statistics. 
3
 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013. 
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prohibitive delays, implementation performance and reform reversals. “The story of 
Pakistan’s energy sector is symptomatic of virtually all sectors of the economy. At the 
micro level, the decision-making in the sector remains inherently flawed, and policy 
initiatives are reduced to shooting in the dark.” The overwhelming evidence from energy 
analysts points to the absence of coordinated policy formulation as a fundamental issue. 
Alahdad identified coordinated policy formulation as a fundamental issue and advocated 
adopting the concept of Integrated Energy Planning and Policy Formulation (IEP) and the 
institutional structure, which supports it [also see a recent monograph, Alahdad (2012)]. 
Rashid Amjad pointed out that the integration of energy plans with economic objective 
remains weak. Stagnation in exports is well documented in recent years, e.g., see Haque 
(2011). 
According to the Economist (2013), “Not charging consumers for electricity has 
created a big problem for Pakistan. At the end of 2012 the country’s stock of energy-
industry debt was $9.1 billion—about 4 percent of GDP—according to a report funded by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and carried out by the 
national Planning Commission. The same USAID–backed report claims power shortages 
retard economic growth by at least 2 percent a year. The situation is deteriorating as the 
debt mountain grows. Riots break out each summer in protest.” The basic fact remains 
that the integration of energy policy plans with macro-economic objectives has remained 
weak since late 1970s and early 1980s. Pakistan export sector growth has not managed to 
offset the rising oil import bill, resulting in high levels of energy subsidies to the 
magnitude of Rs 1,400 billion with little progress to show. 
To add to the energy woes, unfortunately, the deteriorated security situation in 
Pakistan has led to a significant decline in foreign investment in the energy sector as well 
as in the overall economy. It is appalling to note that in a globally integrated economy 
and a global liquidity environment in recent years, net foreign direct investment in 
Pakistan for 2008-13 are USD 5.4, 3.7, 2.2, 1.6, 0.8 and 1.8 billion for each year. The net 
foreign inflows in oil and gas development and exploration declined by 11 percent to 
$560 million in 2013, as compared to $629 million in the previous fiscal year. The oil and 
gas sector contributed 39 percent to the FDI during FY13 as compared to 77 percent in 
2012, mainly due to the worsening law and order situation in Balochistan and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), where exploration activities witnessed contraction. However, it is 
encouraging to see a fresh inflow of FDI in the energy sector in 2014 of $1.2 billion 
(Business Recorder February 2, 2014). 
Meekal (2012) has summed up this current situation as “a never-ending energy 
crisis that has crippled growth and employment prospects, especially in the SME sector 
which is the main-stay of the economy in terms of value-addition, employment, living 
standards and exports.”  Realistically speaking, any decent/worthy economist of our 
generation would be hard pressed to declare the Pakistan’s macroeconomic situation in 
general and energy policy in particular as “satisfactory and sustainable.” Borrowing a 
famous political phrase from President Clinton campaign in 1992, “it is the economy, 
stupid,” we argue in this paper that Pakistan’s macroeconomic policies are inherently 
inconsistent, ad hoc and have significantly contributed to the current crisis in energy, and 
other sectors of the economy. 
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3.  PAKISTAN’S CHRONIC ENERGY DEFICIENCY 
Figure 1 below conveys our chronic energy deficit hypothesis by making a 
comparison of the country’s long-term domestic production and consumption and 
presents a picture of long-term import dependency. The figure also shows fitted trend 
lines for the two series using logarithm functions; estimated equations for time (t) are also 
reported. Detailed statistics on the domestic consumption and production are provided in 
Table A-I in the Appendix. 
 
Fig. 1.  Oil Consumption and Production 
 
 
As the figure indicates, the consumption-production gap has grown from 83,000 to 
327,000 barrels of crude oil per day from 1980 to 2010. The historic average compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR)  of consumption has been 3.51 percent p.a., compared to 
1.75 percent p.a. for the domestic production. As a matter of fact, the domestic 
production has been at a virtual standstill level since the early 1990s. 
As a result of the persistent consumption-production gap, the country has become 
chronically dependent on oil imports, rendering the economy as greatly exposed to high 
and volatile oil prices. Yépez-García and Dana (2012) lay down the key indicators of a 
country’s vulnerability to higher and volatile oil prices. These include a greater share of 
oil imports in percent of gross domestic product (GDP), a high proportion of oil usage in 
the primary energy supply, and a rise in oil imports and expenditures over time. When we 
examine such indicators in relation to Pakistan, as is shown in Table 1, they indicate a 
high degree of the country’s vulnerability. 
As the  Table shows, over the last ten years, the oil imports have increased from 
2.7 percent of the GDP to over 6 percent in current USD terms, while these have 
increased from 2.4 percent of the country’s GDP (in constant USD) to about 10 percent in 
recent years. As a percentage of total imports, the oil imports have doubled to about 35 
percent over the ten year period. More importantly, oil import expenditure, as a 
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percentage of exports, has increased from 18 percent to 57 percent. An important factor 
has been that the country’s exports, which are the main component of the country’s 
capacity to pay for imports, have not kept pace with the oil import requirements. The last 
column in the Table points out to the other aspect of the country’s vulnerability, i.e., 
increasing reliance on the imported oil sources for power generation, the percent of total 
electricity production from furnace oil increasing from about 16 percent in year 2003-04 
to over 35 percent for year 2011-12, and is expected to be higher for the year 2012-13. 
 
Table 1 
Petroleum and Products Imports as Percentage of Key Indicators 
Year % of Exports 
% of 
Imports 
% of GDP 
(Constant 2005 
US$) 
% of GDP 
(Current US$) 
Electricity 
Production from Oil 
Sources 
2003-04 18.3% 16.6% 2.4% 2.7% 15.7% 
2004-05 24.5% 18.7% 3.5% 3.6% 15.9% 
2005-06 36.0% 23.8% 5.4% 5.4% 20.3% 
2006-07 42.5% 27.2% 6.3% 5.8% 28.6% 
2007-08 51.4% 29.7% 8.5% 7.3% 32.2% 
2008-09 52.5% 31.6% 8.0% 6.1% 35.4% 
2009-10 53.2% 33.5% 8.1% 6.5% 38.0% 
2010-11 48.6% 34.3% 9.2% 7.0% 35.2% 
2011-12 58.2% 35.5% 10.4% 6.8% 35.4% 
2012-13 56.8% 35.3% 9.8% 6.1% n.a.  
 
A longer-term picture of the Pakistan’s oil imports in relation to imports, exports 
and the GDP is depicted in Figure 2. As the figure shows, the oil imports have assumed 
an increasing role in the economy. More pertinently, as a growing percentage of exports, 
the oil imports have come to claim a large share of the export earnings, which have been 
on the rise since 2004 in particular. However, the figure also shows that in the 1980s the 
country experienced a similar rise in the oil imports relative to exports. It seems that the 
reliance on oil imports is a more fundamental and long-term problem. 
 
Fig. 2.  Pakistan’s Oil Imports 
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4.  ENERGY PROJECTS AND THE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
A fundamental reason for Pakistan’ chronic deficiency in the energy sector is the 
fact that the country is lacking resources. There are no major oil deposits, and 
unexploited hydro-electric sites are limited and small. Due to political choices regarding 
the nuclear weaponry and technology in the past, driven by security concerns, the options 
of building new nuclear plants for civilian use also seem to be limited in view of the 
associated international concerns. The recent China-Pakistan Nuclear Reactor deal (WSJ, 
Oct. 16, 2013) involves Pakistan acquiring two large nuclear power reactors (1000 MW 
each) from China and will cost $9.1 billion. Notwithstanding the opposing international 
stance, the capital investment will need to be serviced, which will require additional 
foreign exchange earnings. There are prospects for coal based energy plants, mainly 
based on Thar Coal Field, but these are still shrouded in technological and financial 
uncertainties. However, besides the constraint of natural resources, another constraint 
involves financing energy projects that require large inflows of foreign capital and 
technology, even if there is a miraculous expansion in the country’s resource endowment. 
This financial constraint has not been addressed adequately in previous studies on 
Pakistan. 
There are various projects and structural measures in the planning and 
implementing stages relating to an increasing share of renewal energy production, 
diversification and rebalancing of the energy production mix. This will reduce oil 
intensity and exploration for fossil fuels [see for example, Pakistan (2013); NEPRA 
(2013)]. However, the energy infrastructure and production projects are heavily capital 
and technology-intensive that will necessitate large initial foreign investment as well as 
subsequent foreign exchange outflows on account of repatriation of returns and the 
principle. Moreover, the gestation periods for energy projects are generally quite long, 
which increases the final capital costs due to interest that would accrue during the period 
of construction. 
The Capital expenditure (CAPEX) requirements for energy projects vary 
depending on the individual country, type and technology of plant. The US Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) provides estimates of the “overnight” capital required for 
various types of energy projects.4 These costs, summarised below, indicate that a power 
project will call for a capital cost in the range of $2.1 to $8.3 billion in the USA. Capital 
costs for developing countries are much lower, but still substantial compared to their 
resources. 
As a reference we can consider India’s Ultra Mega Power Projects (UMPP). These 
are a series of ambitious power projects planned by the Government of India to provide 
“power for all” by the end of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007–2012). The UMPPs 
would create additional capacity of at least 100,000 MW. The projects, with an average 
capacity of 4000 MW are estimated to cost approximately INR15,000 crores, roughly 
equivalent to USD 2.5 billion each. 
 
4
The term “overnight” refers to the cost of the project as if it would be constructed ‘overnight’ and no 
interest was incurred during its construction. 
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Table 2 
Overnight Capital Cost ($/kW) 
Type of Plant Min Max Average 
   Coal 2,934 6,599 4,416 
   Natural Gas 676 7,108 2,132 
   Uranium 5,530 5,530 5,530 
   Biomass 4,114 8,180 6,147 
   Wind 2,213 6,230 4,222 
   Solar 3,873 5,067 4,374 
   Geothermal   4,362 6,243 5,303 
   Municipal Solid Waste 8,312 8,312 8,312 
   Hydroelectric 2,936 5,288 4,112 
Source: US Energy Information Agency, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/ 
 
As discussed in the previous section, it is likely that Pakistan will remain 
dependent on foreign imports to meet its energy requirements in the future and the 
country will need to generate adequate foreign exchange resources to secure its energy 
needs. We can then proceed to develop a simple model for estimating the country’s 
foreign exchange requirements.  
 
5.  PROJECTION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS 
The main implication of the country’s chronic dependence on imported energy is a 
continuing pressure on its foreign exchange resources. In this section, we develop a 
conceptual model for projecting the demands on the foreign exchange resources given the 
energy sector’s long-term reliance on imports and foreign direct investment in building 
new power capacity. The conceptual model is schematically presented in Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3.  Oil Sector Inflows and Outflows of FX 
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Our model for projecting future FX requirements is a two-sector model: the energy 
sector and the rest of the economy. The energy sector imports oil and incurs payment 
obligations in foreign exchange. Besides oil and related imports, the energy sector also 
requires foreign exchange that can materialise as FDI for plant, equipment and 
technology. The inflow of FDI, however, creates obligations to service the capital 
investments; if these are debt inflows, it would involve interest and repayments of the 
principal. If these are equity investments, we will need to repatriate profits to the 
investors’ commensurate with their expected risk adjusted returns as well as provide for 
possible liquidation. In addition, there would be obligations such as payments for 
royalties, management and licensing fees, etc. These three kinds of foreign exchange 
transactions are shown in Figure 3 as solid lines. As far as the non-energy sector is 
concerned, we, for this exercise, may assume that the import of goods and services are 
paid for by this sector’s matching exports. Thus, any increase in the FX earnings from 
exports of goods and services, would be offset by additional imports of goods and 
services other than oil. These transactions are depicted in the figure as dotted lines. This 
simplification allows us to focus on the oil sector’s FX requirements, which are relevant 
to the present analysis. 
 
6.  MODEL SIMULATION RESULTS AND PROJECTIONS 
Given the simplified model for the oil sector’s FX flows in Figure 3, we conduct a 
simulation exercise under certain simplifying assumptions and stylised facts as explained 
below. 
Our starting points are the country’s current GDP, its oil consumption, production 
and import levels. We assume as a base case that the country would target a 6 percent per 
annum real growth rate in its GDP, and that the oil consumption is a direct function of the 
GDP. This implies that the country’s energy intensity is held constant, though it can be 
argued that it may increase or decrease as incomes rise. At the first pass, we hold the 
current domestic production of oil as constant, which allows us to determine the quantity 
and the value (assuming constant oil prices) of the oil imports. Next, the required quantity 
of oil imports (in M tons) is converted into TWh (tera watt hours) per year. We assume 
that the country would invest in the energy sector each year to create additional power 
capacity that would be adequate to meet the annual addition in import requirements. The 
additional capacity is created at an assumed overnight cost of $2,000 per KW (base case). 
We assume that the new power generating capacity comes on stream in the following 
year, which will help to attenuate the import bill in the following year. Thus, the foreign 
exchange required as FDI is projected. The final calculation involves determining the 
servicing obligations resulting from the FDI, which are assumed to be 10 percent of the 
projected cost per year, as a base case. Working with these assumptions, we project 13 
years into the future up to year 2025. Our projections are, however, based on the assumed 
growth rates and are, therefore, subject to related limitations. 
The results of the simulation are presented in Table A-II (in the Appendix) and are 
shown in Figure 4. The results show that, by increasing domestic production capacity, the 
oil sector is able to reduce its FX requirements, compared to when no new capacity is 
added. The demand for foreign exchange by the year 2025 is projected to be US$ 21.8 
billion without  FDI in new power generation; this demand with the FDI forthcoming will 
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be curtailed to US$ 15.8 billion, a saving of about 27 percent. However, when we include 
the CAPEX foreign exchange requirements, the total FX requirements are in the range of 
US$19-21 billion, essentially eliminating these savings. The main conclusion that can be 
drawn from our simulation is that the oil sector is likely to remain a substantial net user 
of the foreign exchange resources. Table A-IV contains results from simulating foreign 
exchange requirements for the year 2025 under various assumptions regarding rate of 
growth, FDI servicing and the required CAPEX per KW capacity. 
 
Fig. 4.  Projected FX Requirements 
 
 
7.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MACRO-ECONOMIC STRATEGIES 
The country’s chronic energy deficiency has broad implications for macro-
economic policies and management with respect to: the foreign exchange regime, interest 
rates, foreign trade, savings, and domestic and foreign direct investment policies. The 
energy deficiency, and its logical consequences for the demand for foreign exchange in 
particular, have implications for exchange rate policies; see e.g., Mangla (2011) and 
Ahmad (2009). 
Pakistan has experienced a real growth rate of about 4.1 percent per annum over 
1991-2010, which is not much higher than the Hindu growth rate of 3.5 percent.5 As a 
comparison, the economy of India has been growing at a rate of around 6-8 percent since 
economic liberalisation began in the 1990s. The energy deficiency directly affects the 
economic growth rates and can be a binding constraint on the country’s growth. In order 
to achieve a growth rate unconstrained by energy availability, the country must be able to 
import its energy requirements and/or expand its domestic energy production through 
capital investment. Either way, the country would require foreign exchange resources. As 
we have shown in the previous sections, the energy sector is likely to remain a net user of 
 
5The ‘Hindu rate of growth’ is a derogatory term referring to the comparatively low annual growth rate 
of the socialist economy of India before 1991. At the same time, Pakistan grew by 5 percent, Indonesia by 6 
percent, Thailand by 7 percent, Taiwan by 8 percent, and South Korea by 9 percent. The term was coined by 
Indian economist Raj Krishna and popularised by Robert McNamara. 
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foreign exchange funds. Thus, the logical way out is to expand the export capabilities and 
making export expansion central focus of the growth strategy. 
In 2000, Pakistan officially moved away from the managed exchange rate to a 
floating exchange rate regime and can be categorised as managed floater per its official 
pronouncements.6 IMF’s de facto classification of exchange rate regimes, as of July 31, 
2006, however, notes that, “the regime operating de facto in the country is different from 
its de jure regime,” and categorises Pakistan as following “other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements”.  A study by Rajan (2011) examining the exchange rate regimes in Asian 
countries over 1999-2009 period finds that, “Pakistan seems to operate rather ad hoc 
adjustable pegs.” However, it finds insufficient evidence for the existence of any 
systematic exchange rate fixity, but notes a high degree of influence of the US dollar and 
negligible influence of the other currencies for Pakistan, suggesting that the country 
manages its currency against the US dollar. 
Considering that the energy sector is central to the economic growth and shall 
likely remain import dependent, the FX policy needs to be redefined to reflect the 
projected demands of hard currencies. The FX rate, which would reflect its expected 
scarcity value, will be helpful in expanding exports and curtailing domestic consumption 
of oil and related products. Contrary to the above logical implication, there is empirical 
evidence that the Pakistani rupee “suffers from chronic overvaluation,” [Ahmad (2009)]. 
There is also empirical support for Pakistan’s economy as a victim of the Dutch Disease, 
an affliction caused by unrequited transfers and foreign aid.7 Under this condition, 
remittances cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and loss of competitiveness 
of Pakistan’s exports sector and at the same time increase share of the non-tradable sector 
in the economy. Makhlouf and Mughal (2011), Javaid (2009) and Ahmed (2009) find 
empirical support for the Dutch Disease hypothesis for Pakistan. 
The exchange rate has to be consistent with the reality of the country’s chronic 
energy deficit. This implies that the exchange rate should not only reflect its fair value 
notwithstanding the Dutch Disease, but may also be tilted in favour of the export sector. 
The current managed-float seems to be focused on the overall balance of payment, aimed 
at keeping a stable level of foreign reserves. Yet, the country has experienced declining 
foreign exchange reserves over the recent years. In order to create a fair playing field for 
the export sector, the managed-float regime should instead be focused on the current 
account balance minus the transfer payments. Such a policy would imply a higher FX 
rate compared to the rate prevailing under the current policy; i.e., a depreciation of rupee 
compared to its current value. Periodic capital account shocks, e.g., in 2013, are evidence 
to the adjustment of the Pakistani rupee. There would be a concurrent and steady buildup 
of foreign exchange reserves that may prove beneficial in other ways. First, it would exert 
a beneficial impact on the exports and at the same time a stronger dollar will also 
discourage excessive import consumption and help with energy demand management. 
Second, a steady increase in the FX reserves would provide more confidence to the 
foreign investor, which may be critical to attracting the needed FDI to the country. Third, 
 
6
See Janjua (2007) for details on the history of exchange rate regimes in Pakistan. 
7
The term originally referred to natural resource discovery, but has been used with reference to “any 
development that results in a large inflow of foreign currency, including a sharp surge in natural resource prices, 
foreign assistance, and foreign direct investment.”  
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increases in the FX reserves would help to sterilise foreign exchange inflows, curbing 
inflation in the country. Fourth, a steady increase in FX reserves commensurate with the 
growth in the country’s exports and GDP is also required to support trade transactions. 
Exchange rate policies followed by China and India, two oil importing countries, 
have led to a steady increase in their foreign exchange reserves, which are currently 
reported at $3,557 and $281 billion respectively (until recently Indian reserves exceeded 
$300 billion). There is a consensus that China manages its currency to be undervalued in 
pursuit of an export led growth strategy. The steady increase in the Indian FX reserves 
also points out to a slight undervaluation of the INR. 
Another aspect of the exchange rate policy relates to its volatility. As Engel and 
Hakkio (1993) explain, the system of fixed but adjustable rates, as followed by Pakistan, 
introduces a new kind of volatility: volatility caused by the expectations of exchange rate 
realignments. By eliminating the market’s uncertainty about the future exchange rate, a 
system of absolutely fixed exchange rates reduces normal volatility. However, when the 
rates are fixed but adjustable, the market knows that realignment may occur and the 
speculation around the magnitude and timing of the realignment will be reflected in 
exchange rate volatility. Therefore, between realignments, exchange rate volatility will 
tend to be within normal limits, but around the time of realignments it can be extreme. If 
the equilibrium rate continues to trend upward or downward, then the incidence of 
realignment increases, and with it the incidence of extreme volatility also rises. 
From the point of view of the foreign investor, a volatile and steadily weakening 
currency is an anathema to FDI. With larger FX reserves the float managers are in a 
stronger position to dampen volatility, absorb short-term shocks, and thus reduce FX 
economic and transaction exposure for the foreign investor. 
In addition to the exchange rate policy within the managed-float regime, there are 
implications for the monetary and fiscal policies. Inflation and interest rates differentials 
are main determinants of the FX rate, which are affected by monetary and fiscal policies. 
Fundamental macro-economic relationships link saving gaps, public deficits and current 
account deficits. It is quite basic that exchange rates would be strengthened by subduing 
inflation and curtailing fiscal deficits. However, from the perspective of meeting the 
energy sector’s projected FX requirements, a prudent management of the monetary and 
fiscal policies assumes greater significance. 
Monetary policy can also be helpful by maintaining higher real interest rates. Due 
to historical inflation rates well in excess of nominal interest rates, the real interest rates 
in Pakistan have tended to be negative. Partly because of this, in addition to the adverse 
security situation, Pakistan has not been the beneficiary of foreign capital flows to the 
same extent as other emerging countries. India, for example, has been able to capitalise 
on the global liquidity resulting from quantitative easing policies followed by major 
developed countries. 
As a case in point, India’s central bank recently raised policy interest rates for the 
fourth time in six months to fight high inflation, while pulling away from the emergency 
measures recently put in place to support the slumping rupee. In a related move, RBI 
started subsidising some of the cost of hedging against currency risk in foreign currency 
deposits and loans. The programme has raised $10 billion since then; the interest rate of 
about 4 percent on the NRI deposits has been so attractive that some international banks 
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have even been offering loans to non-residents (WSJ, Oct 24, 2013). Thus, measures to 
reduce FX risk with guarantees for repatriation and against restriction/partial blocking of 
FX funds would be necessary for attracting foreign direct and portfolio investment. 
In addition to the monetary and fiscal policy measures that are consistent with the 
long-term dependence on imported energy, institutional and governance measures will 
need to be addressed; these issues have been extensively discussed, e.g., see [Uppal 
(2011)]. Non-economic measures, such as ensuring political stability and security, in 
support of FDI and foreign portfolio investment have been thoroughly discussed in the 
literature and there is a body of good practices that are recommended for creating a 
suitable environment. 
 
8.  CAPITAL ACCOUNT AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
Finally, a few observations on the capital account and the macroeconomic policy 
are warranted. Theoretically, the opening of the capital account should improve the 
country’s access to private foreign capital, ceteris paribus, but because of domestic 
security and economic and political concerns, the inflow of private capital has 
significantly fallen over 2009-2013. Haque (2011) has demonstrated that although capital 
outflows were not a major cause of the decline in foreign exchange reserves during 
Pakistan’s economic crisis of 2008, the open capital account and rupee convertibility 
have made the country more vulnerable to outside shocks. Haque further identifies three 
areas where policy-makers in Pakistan face serious challenges, i.e., (i) macroeconomic 
management, (ii) controlling tax evasion, which the Pakistani rupee’s convertibility has 
made easier, and (iii) minimising the real cost of portfolio investment to the country. 
The movement of capital and international trade are two indicators of global 
integration. The magnitudes of these two flows relative to Pakistan’s GDP provide a good 
indication of its degree of global integration. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s scores on both 
these accounts have continuously deteriorated. The ratio of foreign trade (i.e., exports 
plus imports) to GDP for Pakistan fluctuated between 40 and 45 percent during 2004-08, 
but fell sharply to less than 35 percent in 2009 and continues to fall in recent years. On 
the contrary, India’s trade ratio gradually rose to about 50 percent of GDP, which was 
initially of the same order of magnitude as Pakistan’s; India has become more globalised 
in its trade sector. 
An open capital account also calls for a more vigilant macro-economic 
management because of a potential for economic disruption and increased vulnerability 
to external shocks. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) note: “Periods of high international 
capital mobility have repeatedly produced international banking crises, not as famously 
as they did in the 1990s, but historically,” (p. 8). Similarly, Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2008) observe that “countries that grow more rapidly are those that rely less and not 
more on foreign finance; and in turn foreign capital tends to go to countries that 
experience not high, but low productivity growth.” Haque notes, “The high dependency 
on foreign sources to finance domestic investment has made Pakistan’s economic 
performance highly vulnerable to outside factors. There is little question that this 
dependency will have to be reduced and domestic savings rate drastically raised if 
economic growth in Pakistan is to reach levels comparable to the rapidly growing Asian 
economies.” 
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In summary and in looking at the broader picture, it is the trade deficit, rather than 
the decline in capital flows, that is the basic cause for loss of foreign exchange reserves. 
Thus, energy deficit and concomitant foreign exchange liabilities will require a 
significant boosting of Pakistan’s exports. In recent years the country has come to rely on 
foreign remittances to meet import requirements. These inflows are, however, a mixed 
bag as alluded before. In addition, recent global economic developments, such as tapering 
off the quantitative easing and recent volatility in emerging economies, FX volatility and 
capital account deficits and higher interest rates in the BRICs economies are not good 
omens for the Pakistan’s economy and its trade sector. 
 
9.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Pakistan’s economy is greatly exposed to high and volatile oil prices when 
compared to commonly used economic indicators of a country’s vulnerability; these 
include a greater share of oil imports  in a percent of gross domestic product (GDP), a 
high proportion of oil usage in the primary energy supply, and rising oil imports and 
expenditure over time. It is likely that Pakistan will remain dependent on foreign imports 
to meet its energy requirements for a long time to come and will need to generate 
commensurate foreign exchange resources to ensure long-term energy security. An issue 
which has been  investigated in this analysis relates to how the energy sector’s foreign 
exchange requirements for meeting current consumption and for capital expenditures for 
creating domestic capacity would be financed. This paper has tried to address this 
question and identify its implications for the country’s macroeconomic policy and 
management. 
The paper addresses the implications for macro-economic policies given the 
country’s chronic dependence on imported energy and continuing pressure on its foreign 
exchange resources. The basic fact remains that the integration of energy policy plans 
with macro-economic objectives has remained weak. Pakistan’s export sector growth has 
not managed to offset the rising  oil import bill. To add to the energy woes, the 
deteriorated security situation in Pakistan has led to a significant decline in foreign 
investment. 
We have proposed a chronic energy deficit hypothesis by developing a model 
for projecting the energy sector’s long-term requirements for foreign exchange. An 
analysis of the country’s long term import and capital inflow requirements presents a 
picture of long-term import dependency. As a result of the country’s chronic 
dependence on oil imports, the economy will remain greatly exposed to high and 
volatile oil prices. 
A fundamental issue for Pakistan is how the energy projects requiring large 
inflows of foreign capital and technology would be financed. The energy infrastructure 
and production projects are heavily capital and technology intensive, and will necessitate 
large initial foreign investment as well as subsequent foreign exchange outflows on 
account of repatriation of returns and the principle. It is this financial constraint, which 
has not been addressed adequately in previous studies. The main implication here is that 
there will be a continuing pressure on the county’s foreign exchange resources. Any 
increase in the FX earnings from exports of goods and services in the normal course is 
likely to be offset by additional import of goods and services other than oil. 
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We conducted a simulation exercise, which shows that when we include the 
required FDI for the CAPEX, the oil sector requires additional net inflows of FX 
resources 6 percent to 18 percent above the base case. The demand for foreign exchange 
by the year 2024-25 is projected to be US$ 20-21 billion without the FDI in new power 
generation. However, when we include the CAPEX foreign exchange requirements, the 
total FX requirements are in the range of US$ 23-24 billion. 
The country’s chronic energy deficiency has broad implications for macro-
economic policies and management with respect to the foreign exchange regime and 
foreign direct investment policies. Our analysis suggests that the FX policy needs to be 
redefined to reflect the projected demands on hard currencies. The FX rate, which would 
reflect its expected scarcity value will be helpful in expanding exports and curtailing 
domestic consumption of oil and related products. Moreover, Pakistan’s economy is 
likely afflicted by the Dutch Disease, which is an affliction caused by unrequited 
transfers and foreign aid, and leads to appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
weakening of the competitiveness of Pakistan’s exports sector. Therefore, our exchange 
rate policy has to be consistent with these realities. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A-I 
Pakistan’s Oil Consumption (Thousand Barrels Per Day) 
Year 
Petroleum 
Consumption 
Domestic Oil Supply Consumption- 
Production Gap 
Domestic Production 
% 
1980 104.000 11.200 92.800 10.8% 
1981 113.000 11.200 101.800 9.9% 
1982 134.000 13.200 120.800 9.9% 
1983 137.000 14.200 122.800 10.4% 
1984 140.000 18.200 121.800 13.0% 
1985 159.672 36.200 123.472 22.7% 
1986 165.748 42.109 123.639 25.4% 
1987 180.425 42.070 138.355 23.3% 
1988 194.201 45.144 149.057 23.2% 
1989 205.635 48.031 157.604 23.4% 
1990 220.051 62.039 158.012 28.2% 
1991 221.059 63.341 157.718 28.7% 
1992 227.210 63.675 163.536 28.0% 
1993 256.420 62.549 193.871 24.4% 
1994 282.170 57.651 224.519 20.4% 
1995 298.094 61.948 236.146 20.8% 
1996 326.903 57.624 269.279 17.6% 
1997 333.036 59.560 273.476 17.9% 
1998 346.835 57.843 288.992 16.7% 
1999 368.569 56.572 311.997 15.3% 
2000 365.014 56.763 308.252 15.6% 
2001 360.125 63.374 296.750 17.6% 
2002 355.895 67.931 287.964 19.1% 
2003 336.599 64.330 272.269 19.1% 
2004 326.846 66.592 260.255 20.4% 
2005 336.186 68.126 268.060 20.3% 
2006 357.077 69.257 287.820 19.4% 
2007 382.259 68.687 313.573 18.0% 
2008 389.752 62.604 327.148 16.1% 
2009 390.935 59.846 331.089 15.3% 
2010 392.300 64.898 327.402 16.5% 
CAGR 3.51% 1.75%   
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Table A-II 
Projected Foreign Exchange Requirements for the Oil Sector – USD Million 
Year 
Without New 
Capacity Capital Cost 
With Added 
Capacity 
For FDI 
Servicing 
Total (Incl. 
CAPEX) 
2013 9,525 0 9,525 – 9,525 
2014 10,254 2,581 10,254 258 13,093 
2015 11,027 155 10,298 274 10,726 
2016 11,846 2,745 11,073 548 14,366 
2017 12,714 329 11,166 581 12,076 
2018 13,634 2,929 11,993 874 15,797 
2019 14,610 524 12,142 926 13,592 
2020 15,644 3,137 13,028 1,240 17,404 
2021 16,740 744 13,238 1,314 15,296 
2022 17,902 3,370 14,189 1,651 19,210 
2023 19,134 991 14,469 1,750 17,211 
2024 20,439 3,631 15,495 2,114 21,240 
2025 21,823 1,268 15,853 2,240 19,362 
Average 15,481 1,867 12,767 1,148 15,781 
 
Table A-III 
Total FX Requirements for the Year 2025 (USD Million) 
(Projections under Different Assumptions) 
Annual Growth Rate FDI Servicing Cost CAPEX Cost (per KW) 
3% $13,350 4% $18,017 $   1,250 $ 18,046 
4% 15,073 6% 18,466 $   1,500 18,485 
5% 17,066 8% 18,914 $   1,750 18,923 
6%* 19,362 10% 19,362 $   2,000 19,362 
7% 21,995 12% 19,810 $   2,250 19,800 
8% 25,005 14% 20,258 $   2,500 20,239 
9% 28,435 16% 20,706 $   2,750 20,677 
* Base case. 
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